RUCHO IS RIGHT—BUT FOR THE WRONG REASONS
Louis Michael Seidman*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................865
I.....................................................................................................................86
6

A........................................................................................................866
B.........................................................................................................86
9
II.....................................................................................................................87
2
III...................................................................................................................87
5

INTRODUCTION
In Rucho v. Common Cause,1 the Supreme Court ended its long struggle
to formulate constitutional standards to regulate political gerrymandering by
declaring that it was not up to the job. The Court held that it could not come
up with manageable standards governing the controversy and that it therefore
posed a nonjusticiable political question.2
In this brief Essay, I attempt to defend this outcome. The task is not easy,
and I hope that the reader will at least give me some points for degree of
difficulty. There is no denying that partisan gerrymandering is a very serious
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Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
Id. at 2500.
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evil, and there is no defending Chief Justice Roberts’ dreadful opinion
justifying the Court’s refusal to do anything about it. Still, I argue, on balance,
we are better off without the Supreme Court mucking around with this
problem. Moreover, the reasons why we are better off go beyond this
particular issue and impeach some of the standard arguments for judicial
intervention more generally.
I.
Before proceeding with the more general argument, a note about why
political gerrymandering poses a major problem and why the Court’s
explanation for its failure to deal with it is unconvincing.

A.
Partisan gerrymandering might be defined as the drawing of legislative
district lines with the intent and effect of producing a particular political
outcome, usually the maximization of the political strength of the
gerrymandering party. In one form or another, it has been going on for as
long as we have had a republic.3 At one time, the Supreme Court thought that
it had mostly resolved the difficulty by requiring population equality in
legislative districts,4 but it turns out that it was wrong. Indeed, in recent years,
the problem has gotten much worse. By “packing”—wasting votes by placing
large numbers of extra disfavored voters in a single district—or “cracking”—
wasting votes by dividing disfavored voters between districts so that they cannot
form a majority anywhere—gerrymanderers can produce dramatically unfair
results while still maintaining population equality among districts. 5 By
3

4

5

The word “gerrymander” derives from districting signed into law by Massachusetts Governor
Elbridge Gerry in 1812 that created a district supposedly shaped like a salamander. See
Gerrymander,
ONLINE
ETYMOLOGY
DICTIONARY,
https://www.etymonline.com/word/gerrymander (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). However, the practice
predates the coining of the word describing it. For example, there is evidence that Patrick Henry was
responsible for gerrymandering the congressional district in which James Madison was forced to run
in 1788. For a detailed account, see Thomas Rogers Hunter, The First Gerrymander? Patrick
Henry, James Madison, James Monroe, and Virginia’s 1788 Congressional Districting, 9 EARLY AM.
STUD. 781 (2011).
See
Reynolds
v.
Sims,
377
U.S.
533,
568
(1964) (mandating population equality in state legislative districts). See also Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964) (mandating population equality in state congressional districts).
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era,
26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 289 (1996) (describing how gerrymandering “cracks” and “packs”
populations into districts.) For an argument that packing and cracking is not the optimal
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providing “safe” districts for favored candidates, gerrymanderers create an
environment where the main obstacle to reelection is a primary challenge from
the extreme factions of each party.6
Efforts to accomplish these outcomes used to be constrained by mutually
accepted norms and by technical difficulties in predicting voter behavior and
drawing the right lines. 7 But in recent years, both obstacles have eroded.
Politicians increasingly see themselves as involved in an existential struggle
where even extreme measures are justified,8 and advances in computer science
allow them to implement these extreme measures with clinical precision.9
Both parties have taken advantage of these changes, but, as it happens,
Republicans have taken more advantage of them.10 The result is outcomes
that are deeply unfair. For example, in the 2012 congressional election the
Democrats won the overall popular vote, but the Republicans ended up with
thirty-three more seats.11 A study of the 2018 election, in which the Democrats
picked up forty House seats, showed that Democrats would have been
expected to pick up sixteen more seats based on the average share of the vote
in congressional districts.12 To make things still worse, districting is done by
state legislatures, which are themselves badly gerrymandered in favor of
Republicans.13

6
7
8

9

10

11

12
13

gerrymandering strategy, see Richard Holden, Voting and Elections: New Social Science
Perspectives, 12 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI, 255, 259 (2016).
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 2311, 2335 (2006) (stating that “safe” distrticts lead to the election of more polarized, partisan
candidates).
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2512–13 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Old-time efforts, based on little more than
guesses, sometimes led to so-called dummymanders—gerrymanders that went spectacularly wrong”).
For a discussion of political polarization and its impact on the willingness of politicians to play
“hardball,” see Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—and the
Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2020).
See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that changes in technology “make
gerrymanders far more effective and durable than before, insulating politicians against all but the
most titanic shifts in the political tides. These are not your grandfather’s—let alone the Framers’—
gerrymanders.”).
See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Hardball vs. Beanball: Identifying Fundamentally Antidemocratic
Tactics, 119 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 85, 116–17 (2019) (discussing Republican gerrymandering
efforts).
United
States
House
of
Representatives
Elections,
2012,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2012 (last visited Apr.
13, 2021).
David A. Lieb, GOP Won More Seats in 2018 than Suggested by Vote Share, AP (Mar. 21, 2009),
https://apnews.com/article/9fd72a4c1c5742aead977ee27815d776.
See Shugerman, supra note 10, at 117 (“Republicans engaged in a national state-by-state strategy of
extreme gerrymanders . . . so that even when Democrats won statewide by large margins, the
Republicans would keep the state legislature or the majority of congressional seats.”).
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These outcomes must be considered in the context of other changes that
also erode the legitimacy of our political process. The Senate is grotesquely
gerrymandered to favor Republicans. A vote for a senator in Wyoming is
sixty-eight times more powerful than a vote for a senator in California.14 By
2040, two-thirds of Americans will control only 30% of the Senate.15
The outcome of presidential elections is similarly skewed. In four out of
the last eight presidential elections, a candidate became President even though
a majority of voters chose someone else. In two of these elections, the loser
received more votes than the winner.16
And then there is the Supreme Court itself. Republican presidents have
appointed thirteen of the last nineteen justices to the Court17 even though they
won the popular vote in only six of the last thirteen elections. 18 The last
Democrat to serve as Chief Justice of the United States was Fred Vinson,
whose brief and undistinguished tenure ended more than sixty years ago.19
Before that, one has to go back to Edward White, who fought on the
Confederate side in the Civil War. (Even White was nominated for Chief
Justice by a Republican, but his initial appointment to the Court was by a
Democrat.)20
Given all these facts, it is no wonder that many Americans despair about
the future of our democracy.

14

15

16

17

18
19

20

For Wyoming and California population totals as of 2019, see U.S. States Comparison: Wyoming vs
California,
COUNTRYECONOMY.COM,
https://countryeconomy.com/countries/usastates/compare/california/wyoming (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
See Philip Bump, By 2040, Two-Thirds of Americans Will Be Represented by 30 Percent of the
Senate,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
28,
2017,
12:23
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/28/by-2040-two-thirds-of-americans-willbe-represented-by-30-percent-of-the-senate/ (noting that 70% of Americans will be represented by
thirty senators) .
Statista, ‘Share of electoral college and popular votes of each winning candidate in all United States
presidential elections from 1789-2020,’ https://www.statista.com/statistics/1034688/share-electoralpopular-votes-each-president-since-1789/ (last visited Feb. 17,2021).”
See
Justices
1789
to
Present,
SUP.
CT.
OF
THE
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (listing all Supreme Court Justices through
United States history).

See Share of Electoral College and Popular Votes from Each Winning Candidate, in All United
States Presidential Elections From 1789 to 2016, supra note 16.
See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 17.
See id.
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B.
The Supreme Court cannot be blamed for many of these problems and
cannot be expected to fix all of them. But at least in theory, it could do
something about partisan gerrymandering. Why hasn’t it?
According to the Court, the Constitution’s text provides no clear test by
which to measure the constitutionality of the various districting regimes.21 Of
course, that is true, but it does not distinguish the partisan gerrymandering
problem from virtually all other constitutional controversies that the Court
regularly decides.
What the justices do for a living is to make up tests that are not in the
Constitution.22 They have told us that content-based regulation of speech is
subject to strict scrutiny,23 that racial classifications are justified only if they
satisfy a compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored, 24 and that that
abortion regulations may not unduly burden a woman’s right to choose.25 One
searches the Constitution’s text in vain for any of this. As even many
constitutional originalists concede, nontextual construction of this sort is
essential if the Court is to have any hope of actually applying constitutional
values to the cases that come before it.26
It is true that partisan gerrymandering poses a special challenge because
instances of it can be ranged along a continuum. As the Court points out, the
Constitution commits the task of legislative districting to the political branches.
It is therefore close to inevitable that political considerations will play some
role in the process.27 The question is how much of a role is too much?
21
22

23
24
25

26

27

See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2489 (2019) (“There are no legal standards
discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments.”).
For a sophisticated examination of the doctrinal paths open to the Court if it really wanted to deal
with the gerrymandering problem, see G. Michael Parsons, Gerrymandering and Justiciability: The
Political Question Doctrine after Rucho v. Common Cause, 95 IND. L. J. 1295, 1352–62 (2020).
See, e.g., Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (“Content-based
laws are subject to strict scrutiny.”).
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (“Laws classifying citizens on the basis of race
cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.”).
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (“In our view, the undue
burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s
constitutionally protected liberty.”).
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 458 (2013) (“[T]he construction zone is ineliminable: the actual text of the U.S. Constitution
contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require constitutional construction for their
application to concrete constitutional cases.”).
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019) (“To hold that legislators cannot take
partisan interests into account when drawing district lines would essentially countermand the
Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities.”).
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Philosophers have a technical term for problems of this sort. They call it
the “Sorites Paradox.”28 A collection of sand is either big enough or not big
enough to constitute a “heap,” but we can’t specify precisely how many grains
of sand make it a heap. People are either bald or not, but no one can say how
many hairs a person must lose to achieve the dubious honor of baldness.
In cases like this, a line must be drawn somewhere, and any line will seem
arbitrary. Does that mean that no line can be drawn? Clearly not. The
Supreme Court has regularly used two strategies to confront the problem.
Sometimes, it announces a vague test and leaves the task of filling in the
gaps to lower courts or to its own future cases. The Court has done this in the
closely related context of racial gerrymandering. It has said that race-based
districting is unconstitutional whenever it is so predominant a factor that the
districting can only be explained as an effort to segregate voters.29 Similarly, it
has announced that burdens on the abortion right are unconstitutional if they
are “undue.”30 Racial classifications violate the Fourteenth Amendment and
content-based restrictions on speech violate the First Amendment unless they
are supported by a state interest that is “compelling.”31 Regulation on the use
of real property constitutes a taking if it “goes too far.”32 It violates the Due
Process Clause for a judge to decide a case when one of the parties has made
campaign contributions to the judge if the contributions lead to a “significant
and disproportionate influence.”33
On other occasions, the court simply announces an arbitrary line. For
example, in a closely related context, it has said that in state cases, the one
person one vote standard is presumptively satisfied if there is less than a 10%
maximum deviation between districts.34 Similarly, the state interest in fetal
protection changes at the point when the fetus achieves “viability.”35
28
29

30
31
32
33
34
35

For a detailed description, see Sorites Paradox, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/ (last updated Mar. 26, 2018).
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646–47 (1993) (finding that districting is unconstitutional when “it
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to ‘segregat[e] . . . voters’ on the
basis of race.”). For a powerful attack on the Court’s effort to distinguish between racial and partisan
gerrymandering, see Girardeau A. Spann, Gerrymandering Justiciability, 108 GEO. L.J. 981 (2020).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (applying to racial classifications); Barr v. Am. Ass’n
of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (addressing content-based restrictions).
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017) (quoting Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922)).
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).
See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (“[A]ttacks on
deviations under 10% will succeed only rarely, in unusual cases.”).
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (“We conclude that the line should be drawn at viability, so that before
that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.”),
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Even arch-originalist Antonin Scalia has resorted to arbitrary tests of this
sort. How long does it take after a person is released from custody for an
invocation of Miranda rights to wear off? Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
announced that “[w]e think it appropriate to specify a period of time . . . . It
seems to us that period is 14 days.”36
How long can an arrested suspect be held without a probable cause
determination? In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,37 the Supreme Court
announced that the right answer was a presumptive forty-eight hour limit.38
Justice Scalia’s dissent chastised the majority for ignoring “the clear dictates of
the Fourth Amendment” and relying instead on “its own (quite irrefutable
because entirely value laden) ‘balancing’ of the competing demands of the
individual and the State.”39 He then announced that in his “view” the right
time limit was 24 hours.40
The Rucho Court had available to it both vague tests that might be made
more precise over time and clear tests that are concededly arbitrary. Years
ago, Justice White, writing for a plurality of the Court, suggested a test of the
first type: partisan gerrymandering was unconstitutional “when the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade . . . a group of
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.” 41 Similarly, Justice
Kagan, dissenting in Rucho, argued that gerrymandering was illegal when it
departed “too much” from the state’s own neutral criteria for districting.42
A prominent test of the second type measures the “efficiency gap” defined
as the ratio of “wasted votes”—the total number of votes cast for a losing
candidate and votes over a bare majority cast for a winning candidate.43 How
large an efficiency gap is too large? The leading academic proponents of the
test set the limit as changing the results for two seats in a state’s House of
Representatives delegation or 8% of its state legislative delegation.44

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010).
500 U.S. 44 (1991).
Id. at 56 (“[W]e believe that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause
within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement . . . .”)
Id. at 65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2521 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“This much is
too much”).
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency
Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015) (defining the “efficiency gap” as the difference between the
two major political parties’ “wasted votes,” those votes cast for a losing candidate or those cast in
excess of what the winning candidate needed to win).
Id. at 884.

872

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:4

Are these tests perfect? Of course not. If the Court insisted on perfect
tests, it would never adjudicate constitutional claims. But like much of the rest
of the Court’s doctrinal innovations, the tests are good enough to be
serviceable if the justices really wanted to do something about the problem.
II.
Why, then, should we be wary of a judicial solution? Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion in Rucho is wrong in many ways, but it is right in one way: Political
theorists, judges, and ordinary people are divided over what makes a system
“democratic” and what counts as political “fairness.”45 There is no consensus
about how much protection for minorities is necessary in a democratic system
and about which minorities to protect. We do not agree about the extent to
which popular will should be filtered through a system that protects political
elites from temporary frenzy. We have no shared understanding of whether
proportional representation of politically salient groups is necessary for
democratic legitimacy.
These disagreements translate into disagreement about what should count
as unconstitutional political gerrymandering. Consider, for example, an effort
to create fairness by drawing district lines so as to minimize the “efficiency gap”
between parties. On the macro-level, this districting arguably produces a fair
outcome. But on the micro-level, it creates what John Hart Ely once referred
to as “filler people.” 46 These are voters who are deliberately stranded in
districts where they have no chance of prevailing. Should these voters be
satisfied with the fact that the state delegation, taken as a whole, fairly
represents their interests? Or are they entitled to a fair chance of electing their
own representative?
Similarly, what are we to make of “safe” districts? One might argue that a
fair districting plan requires such districts so that a small majority on a statewide basis does not lead to one party gaining an overwhelming majority of
legislative seats. 47 But safe districts also make it less likely that the

45
46

47

See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500 (“The initial difficulty in settling on a ‘clear, manageable and politically
neutral’ test for fairness is that it is not even clear what fairness looks like in this context.”).
See John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 576, 581–
82 (1997) (giving an example of “filler people”: where every member of a given racial group are
packed into one district, diluting the political power of that racial group).
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986) (“If all or most of the districts are
competitive . . . even a narrow statewide preference for either party would produce an
overwhelming majority for the winning party in the state legislature.”).
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representative will take some account of the interests of voters who chose her
opponent.48
Finally, how should we resolve the potential conflict between fairly
representing the two political parties and fairly representing other salient
groups, like racial or religious minorities? Suppose, for example, that in order
to create a districting plan that fairly apportions power between Democrats
and Republicans, it is necessary to provide disproportionately fewer seats
likely to be captured by African Americans?
There is no obvious way to resolve problems like these. To be consistent,
a believer in democracy might say that disputes about political values should
be resolved democratically. Unfortunately, though, disputes about what
democracy entails cannot be settled democratically without first specifying the
answer to the very question being debated.
But while there are no good answers to the problems, there are some bad
answers. An especially bad answer is turning the question over to nine
unelected and unrepresentative judges who are part of an institution that has
pretty consistently defended the most regressive forces in our society.
Suppose, then, that Rucho had come out the other way. Perhaps tests
based on reducing the efficiency gap, on the state’s own criteria for districting,
or on the danger of permanently fencing out a political minority would
improve the functioning of our democracy. But why should advocates for
these tests believe that the Supreme Court would actually adopt them or fairly
administer them if they were adopted? It is easy to imagine other outcomes.
For example, although the Court purports not to reach the merits, the
majority opinion at least hints that certain forms of political gerrymandering
are constitutionally permissible.49 If it had reached the merits, it might have
endorsed the practice more broadly and vigorously.50 I do not claim that such
a holding would mark a big change from where we are now, but it would
certainly be a step in the wrong direction. It is one thing to say that
gerrymandering poses a constitutional problem but that the Court cannot solve

48

49
50

See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering , 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 410 (“[E]ven the voters in the majority party may lose out if and
when they are placed in districts engineered to provide the majority party with a safe seat since—just
like voters in the minority party—the lack of competitiveness limits their ability to hold their
representative accountable.”).
See note 27, supra.
For an example of what the Court’s argument might have looked like, see Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest in an Empty Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not Regulate
Gerrymandering, 50 WM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2008).
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it. It would be another thing for the Court to give politicians constitutional
permission or even encouragement to engage in the process.
Suppose that the Court held that partisan gerrymandering was
unconstitutional and formulated its own test for dealing with it. Strikingly, in
the years during which a plurality of the Court thought that it could adjudicate
gerrymandering claims, the Court never actually invalidated a districting plan
on these grounds.51 It is entirely predictable that the current justices would
develop a test that was so flabby that it would validate virtually any conceivable
gerrymander.
Worse yet, the justices have made clear that they believe the right to vote
is “individual” and has nothing to do with the fair representation of a group to
which the voter belongs.52 It would be easy to build on this position to hold
that efforts to fairly represent the political parties are actually unconstitutional.
As explained above,53 these efforts inevitably create “filler people” who, as
individuals, are deprived of a fair opportunity to elect representatives reflecting
their interests. It is not hard to imagine that the current Court would therefore
hold that putatively nonpartisan and fair districting is actually
unconstitutional.54
Similarly, the current Court has already shown deep hostility toward efforts
to provide proportional representation for racial minorities. 55 A court
empowered to end political gerrymandering might use that power to further
dilute the voting strength of these groups in the name of protecting the voting
strength of Democrats and Republicans.
The short of it, then, is that there is no good reason to believe that a
decision treating partisan gerrymandering as posing a justiciable issue would
make things better and many good reasons to think that it would make things
worse.

51

52

53
54
55

See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (recounting the Court’s prior disposition of partisan gerrymandering
cases in which the Court concluded that “a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political
gerrymandering”) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999)).
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018) (rejecting the claim that a citizen has
constitutionally cognizable interest in overall composition of legislature independent of an
individual’s right to vote).
See supra note 46 (giving example of “filler people”).
Cf. Rucho, 139 S. Ct., at 2500 (ensuring “fair” share of seats to each party “comes at the expense of
. . . individuals in districts allocated to the opposing party.”)
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that districts drawn to primarily encompass a
historically underrepresented racial group subjects the congressional map to strict scrutiny); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) (holding that race based congressional districts, even though
encouraged by the Justice Department under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
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Why, then, are so many liberal critics of the Court condemnatory of

Rucho? Why are they insistent on giving people who share none of their
constitutional commitments additional power?
The answer, I think, is rooted in deeper pathologies in liberal
constitutionalism—pathologies that I explore in the next Part.
III.
Years ago, in his canonical if idiosyncratic defense of the Warren Court,
John Hart Ely set out a paradigm for dealing with cases like partisan
gerrymandering. Because the Court was a countermajoritarian institution, Ely
thought that it had no business foisting its own values on the American people.
For that reason, he vigorously opposed the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,56
which, he thought, could only be justified by adopting contestable value
judgments.57
But Ely thought that the Court still had an important role to play by
ensuring that the political branches, which did make value choices, made them
democratically. By focusing on the processes of democratic decision making,
the Court could actually be representative reinforcing rather than democracy
denying.58 On this theory, partisan gerrymandering poses exactly the sort of
issue that the Court should resolve.
There are many problems with Ely’s thesis, but for present purposes, it is
important to focus on one of them—what might be labeled the “Ely
Nonsequitur.” It goes something like this:
Premise: The political system is undemocratic and unfair.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court should do something about the
problem.
The conclusion follows from the premise only with an additional,
undefended premise: that the Supreme Court will make things better rather

56
57

58

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
946–47 (1973) (arguing that the court’s decision in Roe v. Wade was not based on the Constitution,
but rather on moral or political value judgements).
See generally, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1980) (arguing that interpretivist
judges are merely filling in gaps in legislation or acting on behalf of their constitutional powers, and
that judges are not immune to popular opinion).

876

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:4

than worse. Depending on one’s point of view, there are two problems with
that premise, each of which independently dooms the syllogism.
From a “neutral” or objective” point of view, which changes make things
better or worse is, itself, contestable. In our political culture, there is
reasonable disagreement about the necessary conditions for democratic
representation – disagreement that cannot be resolved without making value
judgments that are, themselves, contestable. That fact returns us to the
dilemma that is Ely’s starting point—i.e., the illegitimacy of judicial value
judgments.
From the situated point of view of the many progressives who criticize
Rucho, it should be obvious that judicial intervention will not solve our
difficulties. Most progressives understand that we do not want this Supreme
Court deciding what kinds of economic regulation violate substantive due
process. They are increasingly coming to understand that we don’t want this
Supreme Court deciding what regulations of speech violate the First
Amendment. They are wary of Supreme Court judgments about what kinds
of accommodations are necessary to protect religious freedom. Why should
they want this Supreme Court formulating constitutionally mandatory
requirements for political fairness?
As already noted, although Ely’s theory has been influential, it is also
idiosyncratic. But the “Ely Nonsequitur” is generalizable. All pleas for liberal
judicial activism are rooted in assumptions about the Supreme Court that have
little grounding in our history and less grounding in our current reality. Maybe
some time in the future we will have a Supreme Court that we can trust to
make us a more decent, inclusive, and equal nation, but we certainly do not
have that Court now. And even if we did, constitutional liberals need to think
hard about the desirability and durability of elitist, top-down reform that is not
grounded in popular organizing and mobilization.
Years ago, the great legal iconoclast, Jerome Frank, wrote a book that
exposed another nonsequitur that reinforces Ely’s.59 It might be called the
“Freudian Nonsequitur” and goes something like this:
Premise: Life is unfair and things suck.
Conclusion: Don’t worry, Daddy will fix it.

59

See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 8, 18–21 (3d prtg. 1935) (arguing that attorneys
and our legal system look to judges to apply clarity about what the law is, despite the fact that the law
probably is unsettled and there may be different interpretations for a given statutory question).
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At some point, most of us outgrow this comforting myth in other areas of
life, but, despite Frank’s efforts, it retains surprising vestigial strength within
the liberal, legal professoriate. It therefore seems necessary to point out that,
as with the Ely Nonsequitur, the premise is right, but the conclusion does not
follow. Yes, the political process is unfair and undemocratic. Yes, it is stacked
against progressive change. Yes, resort to it is always difficult and often futile.
Still, the Supreme Court is not our daddy and it is not going to fix things.
Once we grow out of the Freudian Nonsequitur, we can begin to face the
disappointing and dispiriting reality of the world we live in. As Freud famously
said, we can then replace our neurotic misery with ordinary unhappiness.
What that means in this context is embracing the truth: that as bad as the
political process is, the only real alternative to acquiescing in injustice is
organizing, voting, protesting, arguing, and resisting. The sooner that
progressives learn that lesson, the better it will be for the country.
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